

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE MUST BE FULLY INTEGRATED WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD.

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I have been a California National Guardsman all of my adult life, I retired from the U.S. Army in February, 1990, with twelve years' service on the Army Staff and worked closely with four CSA's of my era (Rogers, Meyer, Wickham and Vuono). As I read the California submission it became apparent that many of the issues facing the Army and National Guard of the 70's and 80's have again surfaced to marginalize their relationships. I am pleased to note in public statements that the new CSA will be visiting several of these issues early in his incumbency.

1. The Army and Guard prospered from the affiliation relationships of the 80's. A/C divisions partnered with Guard divisions, brigades and, etc. Personal relationships at all levels proved to be strong and in many cases remained long after the programs concluded. Training was more robust and enhanced thru close compliance with doctrine and training guidance. (General Delk knows this program and could provide details.)
2. CAPSTONE PROGRAM became the foundation of the Army/Guard planning/training and mutual support. It aligned Guard units with war plans and CINC's (Combatant Commands). This became the guiding light for the Guard, they knew the Army was serious and they, the Guard, were in "the game" for real. This engendered a strong belief in the Guard they were a part of the Army and what had been strained relationships became mutual problems to solve together. (Gen's Meyer and Shoemaker, USA (Ret) were the architects.)
3. A sense of urgency was created in the Guard with the TPDF (Time Phased Force Deployment) being the "goal line" for Guard commanders. The challenge to prepare separate brigades for deployment in 30 days became the touchdown and proved achievable. One brigade had a wartime mission in 15 days and with some expanded training time with equipment redistribution (within the Guard) was planned and exercised. Direct deployment from home station was planned for many units and integration in Army and joint exercises provided the experience to confirm the unit's reliability. Of course, larger units, divisions, etc. had longer deployment times, but were determined more by lift and mobilization policies than unit readiness.
4. The limited training time available to Guard units was challenged by redesigning the use of week-end/annual training times. Some limited additional days were factored into emphasis upon collective training. NGB supported and encouraged higher levels of training during peacetime to reduce post mobilization training. Programs such as KPUP (Key Personnel Upgrade) provided opportunities for Guardsmen to practice their skills within Army units conducting tactical training. However, the real enhancement came from Guard units training "at the level organized." Battalions, brigades and even divisions tested themselves tactically, logistically and administratively in simulated battle conditions. The first time often resulted in much work to do, but after that the unit's capability always increased exponentially. They knew their failures and worked those out. The 30-60 days of post mobilization time projected for deploying divisions became far more meaningful.

5. Integration of Guard/Army training created a more professional officer and NCO corps in the Guard. The elf confidence of the Guardsmen proved essential in their being asked to be more ready in peacetime than any Guard in history. Personal sacrifices, employer support, family support were all for the better as they believed they were part of the Army and essential to national security. Guardsmen gave of their personal time to improve their military skills. The officer corps was training on an average of ninety days a year much without compensation. Enlisted training also increased without substantial increases in cost. Strength was sustained at historic levels because their training reflected their value to the nation.

6. NGB established a training program to streamline the mobilization process and better prepare for the administrative functions attendant to mobilization. Every annual training period became a "mini" mobilization exercise. The mobilization for Desert Storm was acknowledged as the most successful in history for the Army and Guard.

7. The National Guard Bureau was an essential element in the professionalization of the Guard. They caused the enhancement of Guard training, provided the resources to improve readiness and in conjunction with Army leadership integrated the Guard into the Army. Any reorganization of the Army should provide for a larger role for NGB in establishing training and readiness standards. They know he Guard and hos to get the most.

8. The Army and the Guard of my time suffered two major proposed aviation redesigns fostered by DA, Aviation Division, neither attained their objectives. Both began with CSA support but faltered when Joint Staff, OSD and DA realized their purpose was more to attain organizational objectives (at considerable expense) than to give the Army combat flexibility and sustainment in a high intensity battlefield environment. Anticipated losses in both airframes and crews in early engagements soon negated army aviation support and that the follow on forces provided by the Guard was the only capability available to our forward deployed forces and even that fell far short of the need.

9. The critical nature of this became known in congress and accelerated their allocation of resources to increase and modernize the aviation force. In addition, VCSA General Max Thurman, became engaged and we would meet to consider how the army might return to the army Guard and reserve forces, army trained aircrews that reside near army facilities where aircraft were available to sustain some degree of skill so that recall might be abbreviated. The Guard would provide the umbrella that retained them in an inactive status until needed. VCSA was able to identify the geographical areas where there was a high concentration of army trained air crews. All appeared well, Thurman went on to another assignment and nothing further was achieved.

This should not be a matter of conflict, it is far too important for both components. General Thurman would work this incrementally, designing training and operations to employ available resources for Total Army objectives, to include a resource program to substantially increase aviation assets for both components. Sequestration is an obstacle, however, it is avoidable and should not be an inhibitor to future growth and modernization.